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Abstract Civil society strengthening programs aim to
foster democratic governance by supporting civil society
organization (CSO) engagement in advocacy. However,
critics claim that these programs foster apolitical and
professional organizations that have weak political effects
because they do not mobilize citizen participation. This
literature focuses on how donor programs lead to low
legitimacy of CSOs with citizens, limiting the means to
develop agency toward the state. Here I investigate the
influence of CSO legitimacy with donors and citizens on
civic agency. Empirical research was conducted in Bosnia–
Herzegovina on CSOs considered legitimate by donors,
citizens, and both. I found that different forms of legiti-
macy were associated with different strategies and agency.
CSOs with both forms of legitimacy, which have not
received much attention until now, turned out to be of
particular interest. These CSOs demonstrated agency as
intermediaries between donors, government, and citizens,
which enabled greater agency and broader outcomes.
Keywords Civil society building  Legitimacy  Civic
agency  Bosnia–Herzegovina
Introduction
International donor agencies frequently provide support to
civil society (CS) because they expect that the result will
be to foster democratic governance by enabling the repre-
sentation of interests and holding elected officials
accountable (Diamond 1994; Ottaway and Carothers
2000). The literature on these CS strengthening programs,
however, has highlighted their rather weak effects on
governance (Belloni 2001; Harriss 2001; Pouligny 2005;
Suleiman 2012). A critique argues that the lack of theo-
rized effects on governance is because donors are essen-
tially looking in the wrong place; CS strengthening has
focused on ‘professional’ non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) while overlooking grassroots, traditional interest
groups and non-formal forms of CS (Chahim and Prakash
2014; Howell and Pearce 2001; Kostovicova 2010). CSOs
from the overlooked group, such as unions and coopera-
tives with a grassroots focus and membership base, are
being crowded out by foreign-funded organizations (Cha-
him and Prakash 2014; Howell and Pearce 2000). The
approach to change favored by donors is ineffective
because it emphasizes foreign expertise over local knowl-
edge (Fagan 2008; Pouligny 2005). Donor bias in favor of
technocratic, professional, and apolitical NGOs is seen to
have reduced CS to a technical exercise (Bebbington et al.
2008; Harriss 2001; Pouligny 2005) and to focus the sup-
ported organizations on rendering services rather than
fostering society–state relations (Verkoren and van Leeu-
wen 2012).
The conclusion regarding the apolitical organizations
that result from donor support is that do not engage in
political approaches to achieving their goals. Based on this
literature on CS strengthening programs, we expect that
donor-supported civil society organizations (CSOs) would
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have limited ‘civic agency’ (Fowler and Biekart 2013)
toward the state. By civic agency, I mean the capacity and
actions to influence laws and policies on behalf of
constituents.
The literature has increasingly addressed the issue of
legitimacy in explaining that donor-supported CSOs do not
typically engage in political approaches to achieve their
goals because they lack the means. That is because donor-
supported CSOs are often not accepted by citizens. A lack
of legitimacy in the eyes of citizens reduces the ability of
these CSOs to engage in political mobilization and citizen
participation, even though such activities are a key theo-
retical mechanism for impacting democratic governance
(Diamond 1994; Verkoren and van Leeuwen 2014; White
2004). The availability of donor funding leads to the cre-
ation of new CSOs with little local backing. These orga-
nizations are accountable primarily to donors, not citizens.
In addition, initiatives in which citizens unite for social or
political change either receive little assistance or ‘NGO-
ize’ in order to become eligible for funding, leading to a
growing distance from their constituency (Bebbington et al.
2008; Chahim and Prakash 2014; Hilhorst 2003; Suleiman
2012). The local legitimacy of CSOs is central to these
arguments, focusing as they do on the weak connections of
donor-supported CSOs to local constituencies.
The critique also draws conclusions about which CSOs
are considered legitimate with donors, namely, those that
are professional, technocratic, and apolitical. However, this
existing research on CS strengthening emphasizes the
CSOs supported by donors, while much less research has
addressed the CSOs without donor support. Due to this
selection bias, the ability of the existing research to draw
conclusions about the impact of local versus donor legiti-
macy, or a lack thereof, is limited. This study addresses this
gap by selecting CSOs with variations in their forms of
legitimacy—those that have high legitimacy with donors
but not citizens (‘donor darlings’), those that have high
legitimacy with citizens but not donors, and those that have
high legitimacy with both citizens and donors. This pro-
vides a more solid base from which to understand the
effects of both forms of legitimacy, as well as their com-
bined effect (following Verba et al. 1994).
This article will thus address the research question ‘How
do CSO legitimacy with donors and citizens influence civic
agency and outcomes in the presence of donor CS
strengthening programs?’ In order to do so, empirical
research was conducted in Bosnia–Herzegovina (Bosnia).
Bosnia is an instructive case because the recovery from the
1992–1995 war in the immediate aftermath of the cold war
meant that it was a major focus of donor attention as few
other countries in the world. CS strengthening formed a
core of these efforts and the literature on Bosnian CS
echoes key elements of the critiques of CS strengthening
programs described above (Belloni 2001, 2007; Fagan
2005). Even more than 20 years later, Bosnia remains in
fifth place among democracies for the most donor aid per
capita (Center for Systemic Peace 2017; World Bank
2017). As a result, the effects of donor aid might be more
pronounced, making Bosnia an extreme and, therefore, an
instructive case regarding CS strengthening programs (Yin
2003).
By illuminating the separate and combined effects of
both donors and citizens as sources of CSO legitimacy, the
research adds empirical data to the literature on CS
strengthening programs. I show how different types of CSO
legitimacy can be used to help understand their civic
agency or lack thereof. My findings suggest that the cri-
tiques articulated above need to be nuanced. For one thing,
where other publications suggest that local and donor
legitimacy are mutually exclusive, I detected CSOs that
combine both forms of legitimacy, which appears to
enhance their civic agency. Second, I found that, in con-
trast with Western CS literature, in a context like Bosnia,
informal ties to political actors—which below will be
called ‘transactional capacities’—often lead to more civic
agency than the ability to mobilize citizens—or ‘partici-
patory capacities.’ Third, my findings suggest that some
forms of expertise can be relevant for civic agency but that
donors and politicians have quite different understandings
of professionalism and expertise.
This article will first elaborate on the literature referred
to above regarding CSO legitimacy and its influence on
civic agency. Next, it will discuss the methodology that
was used. Each of the three categories of CSOs, defined by
variations in legitimacy with citizens and donors, will be
described and illustrated with a case study. A final section
makes the arguments introduced above based on the dif-
ferences in civic agency between the legitimacy categories.
CSO Legitimacy and Its Influence on Advocacy
Roles
This section will begin by defining CSO legitimacy and
justifying the relevance of my approach to the study of
donor and citizen legitimacy. Next, the literature on CSO
legitimacy in Bosnia is examined. Then, civic agency is
defined and operationalized, also in relation to the theo-
retical distinction between participatory capacity and
transactional capacity. This section will conclude with a
diagram of the concepts and relationships present in the
research question.
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Understanding CSO Legitimacy
Organizational legitimacy has been most elaborated in the
neo-institutionalism school, according to which legitimacy
derives from an organization’s environment (Brinkerhoff
2005, p. 5). A CSO’s legitimacy can be defined as ‘a
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and
definitions’ (Suchman 1995, p. 574). Legitimacy arises via
intersubjective processes of ‘legitimation’ in which CSOs
make claims of legitimacy and come to be considered
appropriate and trustworthy (Hilhorst 2003, p. 4). Although
legitimacy is based in subjective perceptions, its conse-
quences are tangible, generating material and other
resources and affecting the functioning of organizations.
The critiques of CS strengthening programs described
earlier focus on the perspectives of citizens and donors as
key actors whose perceptions can ‘legitimate’ an
organization.
The literature on CS strengthening programs has fre-
quently put donor-sponsored organizations in one category
and grassroots and traditional organizations in another
distinct and mutually exclusive category (Chahim and
Prakash 2014; Pouligny 2005; Verkoren and van Leeuwen
2014). Some studies on Bosnia support the idea that
organizations with local legitimacy are not the same as
those considered legitimate by donors (Belloni 2001;
Pupavac 2005). However, only a few studies exist
regarding local opinions on CSOs. The findings of these
studies are that citizens prefer organizations offering direct
‘help’, such as social services and humanitarian aid
(Grødeland 2006; Pickering 2006). On the other hand,
mobilization and ‘political activities’ are seen negatively
(Helms 2014), probably because politics itself is tainted by
conflict and corruption. Citizens also have critical opinions
about donor programs. Citizens often assess donor pro-
grams based on whether they ‘solve concrete problems’,
and their skepticism about donors’ normative frameworks
and results contribute to the dearth of CSOs enjoying
legitimacy for both groups. However, earlier research by
this author found that the combination of legitimacy with
donors and citizens is possible (Puljek-Shank and Verkoren
2017). We will return to this below.
Civic Agency: Participatory or Transactional
Capacities?
Civic agency is adopted here in order to consider whether
and under what conditions CS actors do demonstrate the
agency that is theoretically assigned to CS. This is agency
with the ability to limit state power, provide alternative
channels for representing interests, and strengthen state–
society relations (Diamond 1994; White 2004). This is,
after all, what CS strengthening programs have aimed to
achieve. Civic agency in its simplest form is concerned
with agency on behalf of groups toward the state. For the
reproducibility and analytical clarity of this research, a
precise definition of civic agency is needed. In fact, agency
itself can be challenging to operationalize. As put by Long,
‘Agency is usually recognized ex post facto through its
acknowledged or presumed effects’ (2001, p. 240). To
address this difficulty, civic agency was defined as ‘the
perception of capacity, and action to create change for a
common good’, leading to operationalization based on the
capacities and actions.
‘Common good’ describes the desired outcomes of civic
agency on behalf of a group. The theory regarding the
enhancing effect of CSOs as alternative channels for rep-
resenting interests (Diamond 1994; White 2004), and
facilitating and enhancing collective action (Ostrom 2015),
concerns this ability of CSOs to achieve desired outcomes
by representing a group of constituents vis-a`-vis the state.
A common good is thus not a partial or club good that only
benefits its contributing members (Olson 1971; Welzel
et al. 2005). Common goods are, however, public goods,
subject to the ‘free-rider problem’ and the dynamics of
individual collective action (Olson 1971). Common good is
used rather than public good because public good refers to
both those that ‘can only be defined with respect to some
specific group’ as well as those available to all citizens
(Olson 1971, p. 14). Common good is also used because
CSOs representing their members’ interests can also do so
at the expense of the public good writ large (Gugerty and
Reynolds 2010). Perceptions of capacities are included
based on the idea that actors can only be said to have civic
agency if they perceive that they can influence other actors
in their environment. The following section will examine
two distinct forms of capacity from theory and empirical
research.
Because of their ability to politically mobilize citizens to
a variety of actions under the rubric of participation, CSOs
are frequently considered relevant for governance both in
theory and by donors. A theoretical link between CSOs and
their ability to mobilize political participation has a rich
history leading back to de Tocqueville (2002) and the early
wave of neo-Tocquevillian scholars (Diamond 1994; Put-
nam 1992; White 2004). This tradition identifies the effects
of CSOs on democratic governance due to limiting state
power and providing alternative non-electoral channels for
representing interests (Diamond 1994). CSOs have also
been found to facilitate and enhance collective action at a
local scale (Ostrom 2015). Participatory democracy theory
connects participation with greater levels of political
872 Voluntas (2018) 29:870–883
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efficacy (Montoute 2016). This is because participation
increases citizens’ political awareness, increases efficacy
and empowerment, and promotes a more equal and more
stable society (Hilmer 2010; Montoute 2016). However,
many critiques of CS strengthening programs conclude that
these outcomes rarely happen due to the low legitimacy of
donor-supported CSOs with citizens. These debates
regarding the participatory effects of CSOs on governance
in democratizing polities are also reflected in the literature
on the experiences of post-Communist Europe (Crotty
2003; Ost 2005; Raiser et al. 2001). Howard’s (2003)
study, for example, made the case that persistent low levels
of CSO membership, an indicator of low legitimacy with
citizens, were the cause of the ‘weakness of civil society’.
The thesis that CSO impact derives primarily from its
ability to mobilize participation, however, has been chal-
lenged by scholarship, which finds that these low levels of
CSO membership and individual participation do not
inherently limit CSO capacities and efficacy. This literature
argues that individual participation or ‘participatory acti-
vism’ should be complemented by ‘transactional activism’,
i.e., ‘ties—enduring and temporary—among organized
nonstate actors and between them and political parties,
power holders, and other institutions’ (Petrova and Tarrow
2007, p. 79). Participatory activism includes electoral and
contentious politics, interest group activities, and—more
broadly—individual and group participation in civic life.
Transactional activism describes the observed salience of
linkages to authorities that facilitate negotiation related to
activists’ goals. It is transactional in that strategic net-
working and problem-solving with authorities are used to
achieve desired ends. Its proponents do not dispute the
weakening effects of low CSO membership; rather they
claim that the transactional character of activism merits
attention due its implications for the potential of negotia-
tion with the state and elites (Cox 2012; Petrova and Tar-
row 2007; Puljek-Shank 2017). This literature sees the
relevance in whether CSOs possess the ‘resources and
skills to gain a voice in the public sphere’ (Rikmann and
Keedus 2013, p. 161). Finally, a transactional approach is
of interest because CSOs have been found to have influ-
ence to the extent that they bring resources lacking but
sought by states (Fagan 2010, p. 73; Montoute 2016). As a
result, these dynamics regarding capacities might have
broader applicability regarding the impact of CS strength-
ening programs on governance in other democratizing
polities. To summarize, there are reasons to consider the
civic agency of CSOs from both participatory and trans-
actional perspectives.
The concepts examined in this research are represented
in Fig. 1. The civic agency of CSOs, positioned centrally,
is the phenomenon being investigated. The diagram
includes three types of actors—political actors, citizens,
and donors. Transactional capacity is diagrammed with a
dashed bi-directional arrow indicating the participation of
both political actors and CSOs. Participatory capacity is
diagrammed with a directional dashed arrow indicating the
ability of CSOs to mobilize citizens. The independent
variables are the two sources of legitimacy, legitimacy with
donors and citizens. The remainder of the article will
address the separate and combined effects of legitimacy
with donors and citizens on capacities and civic agency.
Transactional 
capacity
Participatory
capacity
Citizens (members/beneficiaries)
Legitimacy with 
donors
CSO
Civic Agency
Legitimacy with 
citizens
Political actors
Legitimacy and CSO Civic Agency
Fig. 1 Relationships being studied
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Methodology
The first step was to map CSOs from three focus areas of
youth, women, and social welfare. The focus areas were
chosen as marginalized groups,1 which are both objects of
international CS strengthening efforts and also have
potential local constituencies (Belloni and Hemmer 2010;
European Commission 2005; EVS 2010). CSOs with high
and low legitimacy were initially identified via interviews
with key informants who were selected to represent diverse
and socially significant perspectives.2 The use of unlikely
conditions to test a theory, such as considering marginal-
ized groups to understand the emergence of civic agency,
has been called Sinatra-inference (i.e., ‘if it can make it
here, it can make it anywhere’) (Levy 2008, p. 12).
I selected those CSOs that could be assigned to one of
three categories based on combinations of legitimacy with
donors and citizens, as indicated in Table 1. CSOs were
selected if there were multiple consistent mentions by key
informants as described above, and by a cumulative
assessment of multiple indicators (see Table 2). The rela-
tively objective indicators for constituency support were
used to confirm the legitimacy or lack thereof for parts of
the population (i.e., becoming a member, providing finan-
cial support, and/or volunteering are actions taken by the
population that indicate legitimacy).
Next, a list of advocacy initiatives with political goals
was composed for each of the 27 selected CSOs based on
document analysis and an initial interview with the CSO
leadership. Advocacy is used here to mean any actions to
influence the state. This includes both actions intended to
mobilize citizen participation (e.g., protest, participation in
consultations) as well as those conducted directly with
political actors and bureaucrats (e.g., lobbying, use of
expertise, convening state agencies). Advocacy strategies
were identified based on the coding of the staff interviews
and documents. Although the literature includes linkages
between different categories of CSOs as transactional
capacity (Petrova and Tarrow 2007), these were coded as
participatory because of their focus on horizontal ties with
CSOs that enjoy legitimacy with citizens. Those strategies
repeated by more than one CSO are listed in Table 3.
Pearson’s Chi-squared tests of marginal independence were
used to determine the association between the legitimacy
variables and the application of each strategy. The differ-
ences in the incidence of specific strategies and the
underlying forms of capacity (participatory or transac-
tional) are the basis for the empirical findings. However,
with few cases and the resulting low incidence values, a
result of statistically significant associations between
legitimacy and strategy use was only possible for five
strategies.
Finally, ten of the CSOs were selected as case studies
using theoretical sampling (Flick 2009) based on the three
Table 1 Legitimacy analysis
and case-study CSO sample
selection grid
High legitimacy with donors Low legitimacy with donors
High legitimacy with citizens 14 CSOs identified 9 CSOs identified
Low legitimacy with citizens 4 CSOs identified No examples founda
aTable 1 represents the expectation that CSOs with low local and low donor legitimacy were both unusual
and not of interest for the inquiry and in fact none were identified
Table 2 Indicators of legitimacy
Type of
legitimacy
Indicator Sources
With citizens Amount of voluntary financial support CSO websites, (Daguda et al. 2013),
interviews
Types and intensity of interactions with citizens (volunteering, informing, participation) Interviews, constituency survey
With donors The frequency of references and consultation invitations, nature of assessments,
amounts, and frequency of grants
Donor reportsa
aSee Appendix A in the Supplemental Materials
1 As demonstrated by levels of employment (10.9% of youth ages
15–24 actively seeking employment and 22.7% of women vs. 31.7%
of the total population) and 2011 CSO grant support for women’s
CSOs (0.7% of total), youth CSOs (2.8%), and social welfare
categories that included disabled and drug dependency CSOs (5.1%)
(Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2014; Center for
Investigative Journalism 2011). In addition, 17% of Cantonal
ministers and 22% of state ministers were women (Sarajevo Open
Center 2015). Within social welfare, recommended CSOs provide
assistance regarding development disabilities, life-threatening dis-
eases, and children.
2 Twenty-seven key informants from the following categories were
included: political actors (4), religious CS (3), media and business (3),
CS networks (5), international CS (2), CS Building projects (4),
donors (4), and international political actors (2). Key informants were
selected based on experience relating to CSOs in addition to their
primary sectors, and their assessments regarded CSOs to which they
did not have institutional ties to reduce potential bias.
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quadrants in Table 1. Each case-study organization was
researched in greater depth by process tracing. Process
tracing involved interviews with state and other CS actors
and relevant internal and public document review. Process
tracing was selected in order to examine the evidence for
civic agency as a causal mechanism in contrast to the
evidence that the observed outcomes were caused by the
actions of other actors. While the article is based on the
evidence regarding advocacy strategies for the broader
group of CSOs, the case studies will be used to illustrate
the observed differences in advocacy strategies.
Empirical Findings
This findings section discusses the civic agency of the three
categories of CSOs. The first subsection will address the
category least-commonly discussed in the literature, those
having legitimacy with both donors and citizens. Each of
the subsections will elaborate on the results presented in
Table 3: Advocacy strategies) and Table 4: Association
between legitimacy and advocacy strategies). The second
and third subsections will elaborate on the impact of one
form of legitimacy without the other. This enables revis-
iting the critiques of CS strengthening programs and
drawing some conclusions regarding their impact on civic
agency.
Legitimacy with Citizens and Donors
This section will discuss the CSOs that enjoy legitimacy
with both citizens and donors. Compared to the other cat-
egories, these CSOs pursue broader goals to greater effect
by serving as active intermediaries between donors and
local actors. First, these CSOs are able to achieve these
outcomes because they bring donor financial and symbolic
resources. They also function as intermediaries by collab-
orating with other CSOs that are accepted by constituen-
cies. Second, both collaboration and their own legitimacy
with citizens strengthen their legitimacy with political
actors and, therefore, their ability to achieve outcomes. In
short, they can more often successfully navigate their
environment in order to achieve support from both donors
and diverse local actors. These dynamics are elaborated
through a case study that highlights the intermediary role of
CSOs with both forms of legitimacy.
This group of CSOs was able to achieve broader out-
comes as measured by the degree of implementation, their
longevity, and the amount of money allocated to them by
the state (See Appendix B in the Supplemental Materials).
This is based on the acknowledged role of CSOs from this
category in passing the Federation and Republika Srpska
(RS) Laws on Youth,3 which created youth councils and
led to new policies and budget allocations at the municipal
and (to a varying degree) higher levels of governance. In
addition, the civic agency of these CSOs led to ongoing
state funding for domestic violence shelters, criminaliza-
tion of domestic violence, and improved responses to
victims by state institutions (United Women 2007). In
contrast, the civic agency of the other categories was
focused on narrower and more incremental governance
goals. The other categories were also frequently only able
to achieve formal but not substantive (implemented and
funded) outcomes.
The combination of legitimacy with donors and citizens
is associated with an increased prevalence of transactional
strategies (Table 3). Both policy adoption and monitoring
strategies enable engagement with the government and the
potential for in-person lobbying, a form of transactional
capacity that many interviewees indicated is the most
effective at achieving desired outcomes (Interviews, 20
February 2013, 13 April 2013). The case studies provide
evidence that this is because donor support enables finan-
cial and symbolic resources sought by political actors.
Namely, donor resources are a key element of how advo-
cacy strategies are frequently implemented. They enable
the use of elegant facilities and cover lodging, travel, and
food for government participants in training and consulta-
tion events. Flashy reports and strategy documents, also
produced in English, reflect positively on the participating
institutions. Moreover, publicity events (distributed by
media that are compensated) provide exposure and political
benefits to elected Sofficials (Interviews, 17 April 2013, 14
September 2012, 4 December 2013, Conference on Youth
Councils, 22 April 2013). Furthermore, donor support
frequently brings international diplomatic support and
together with the imprimatur of international conventions
Table 4 Association between
legitimacy and advocacy
strategies
Independent variable Strategy application Type of capacity (participatory/transactional)
Legitimacy quadrant Yes*** Yes***
Local legitimacy Yes*** Yes**
Donor legitimacy No Yes***
*p\ 0.1; **p\ 0.05; ***p\ 0.01
3 The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and RS are sub-national
entities established by the Dayton Peace Agreement with considerable
autonomy regarding education, social policy, and policing.
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provides foreign support for political narratives of progress
and change. Moreover, the context of CS strengthening
programs means that such trappings are common and
expected, and engaging with government around goals and
processes initiated by CSOs is difficult without them.
Although transactional strategies are also implemented
without these donor resources, they are most frequently
implemented when supported by donors. The importance
of the expectation created by this context will be seen in
comparing this category to those CSOs that also have
legitimacy with citizens but low legitimacy with donors.
In addition to the sensitivity to donor resources articu-
lated above, political actors are also sensitive to the legit-
imacy of CSOs with citizens. Political actors tend to
support CSO initiatives that are not just about appearances
but that are also constructive and focused on results and the
‘everyday needs’ of constituencies (Interviews, 31 August
2012, 11 September 2012, 26 September 2012). They are
also responsive to whether CSOs are accountable to
members (Interview, 12 November 2013) and if they, in the
words of a Federation Member of Parliament, ‘really rep-
resent a wider group of citizens and their interests’ (In-
terview, 26 September 2012).
The CSOs that enjoy legitimacy with both donors and
citizens are able to function as intermediaries between
donors, citizens, and the government. This function as
intermediaries is partly financial, referring to the CSOs’
capabilities to receive donor funds and apply them to
solving concrete needs of citizens. CSO legitimacy is rel-
evant for this process because the CSOs in this category
frequently strengthen their intermediary role through their
ability to partner with organizations that enjoy high legit-
imacy with citizens but low legitimacy with donors. Hel-
sinki Citizens Assembly (HCA) from Banja Luka
advocates with a human rights normative framework and
fits into this group. Other CSOs that have high legitimacy
with citizens but low with donors indicated that the legit-
imacy of HCA led them to be willing to cooperate. As
stated by a staff person, ‘what separates project ‘‘In’’ from
many, many others is that it is implemented by HCA …
and four high-quality partner organizations with long
experience which work directly with beneficiaries. We
created the program with nuances for our end beneficia-
ries.’ (Interview, 12 November 2013). In this way, HCA
was able to advocate for the rights of the disabled by
addressing the specific needs of the developmentally dis-
abled. This is an example of a partnership between ‘in-
termediary’ CSOs that enjoy support with donors and
citizens and ‘representative’ ones that enjoy legitimacy
with citizens but not donors. The prevalence of such
partnerships indicates the strategic way that these different
kinds of CSOs approach such partnerships to advance their
respective goals. The intermediaries could successfully
navigate their environment in order to achieve support
from both donors and diverse local actors.
The partnerships discussed above are also a way of
building legitimacy with political actors. Namely, political
actors perceive that collaboration between CSOs strength-
ens CSO legitimacy. For an official in the RS Ministry for
Health and Social Welfare, ‘for a real step forward it would
be much better to have an articulated, unified position, a
high-quality, progressive position. Then the administration
would be able to take it more seriously’ (Interview, 12
November 2013). The CSOs in this group function as
‘intermediaries’ by the way that they strategically foster
and utilize trusting relationships with other CSOs as a way
to legitimate themselves with political actors.
The ways that CSOs utilize both forms of legitimacy
will be illustrated through the youth CSO KULT. KULT is
a professionalized and large organization by Bosnian
standards, occupying a spacious house in the Sarajevo
outskirts of Ilidza. It emerged from student organizing and
more specifically frustrations with the politicized student
union. KULT conducts leadership training programs,
capacity building for youth CSOs, policy advocacy at the
Federation and national levels, and runs a municipal youth
center. Its staff claimed to have helped draft and pass the
Federation Law on Youth, a contribution recognized by
others. The youth councils created by the law were repre-
sented as evidence that KULT worked toward and achieved
empowerment for youth. As stated by a staff person, ‘now
government can’t say that they don’t have an equal partner
to talk to’ (Interview, 31 March 2013). The salience of this
claim in the legitimation of KULT was demonstrated when
others referenced their important role in convening and
training the youth councils as a reason for KULT’s legiti-
macy. In the words of KULT staff, ‘only youth know what
they need’. In a KULT-organized conference, presentations
by youth council representatives from three cities provided
indications of the participatory capacity of the councils
with young citizens in that they were able to mobilize to
attend municipal assembly and planning meetings. These
councils also demonstrated civic agency in that they were
able to overturn funding reductions and had leverage in
negotiations with municipal assemblies. This civic agency
was pursued for common goods, including youth centers
and activities, such as language and computer classes.
To summarize the findings regarding CSOs that enjoy
legitimacy with donor and citizens: they demonstrate civic
agency in pursuit of broader goals and are able to more
effectively pursue them by serving as active intermediaries
between donors, citizens, and political interests. In order to
achieve these results, they use transactional advocacy
strategies, such as policy adoption and monitoring, in such
a way that depends on donor resources as a means to
deepen engagement with government actors and to create
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opportunities for personal lobbying. CSOs that enjoy
legitimacy among donor and citizens also function as
intermediaries by fostering partnership relationships with
other CSOs and interest groups.
Legitimacy with Citizens but not Donors
This section will discuss the civic agency of those CSOs
that enjoy legitimacy with citizens but not donors, begin-
ning with an illustrative case study. These CSOs are dis-
tinguished by their more frequent application of
contentious politics, their active response to participation
opportunities, and in the degree to which they develop
expertise relevant for advocacy. This means that their civic
agency is guided by the representation of specific con-
stituencies. However, this section will also describe how
their lack of donor legitimacy limits their ability to achieve
governance outcomes.
These strategies will be elaborated via the umbrella CSO
MeNeRaLi. MeNeRaLi was founded in the midst of the war
in 1993 and emphasize that they represent parents of
developmentally disabled individuals who make up 29 local
chapters across the RS. It is primarily funded by the RS
government and is officially recognized via membership in
an RS-level alliance of social welfare organizations. Since
2011, MeNeRaLi has focused on ‘analysis and giving con-
crete suggestions for social inclusion of our beneficiaries into
the community through services within the social welfare
system’ (Interview, 12 November 2012). During this pro-
cess, the approach has been incremental, emphasizing sub-
stantive implementation of a few rights over the formal
adoption of many. Its major advocacy initiatives have been
related to the revision of the RS Law on Social Welfare
(LSW) (Narodna Skupsˇtina RS, 2012). MeNeRaLi initially
engaged in active participation regarding this revision in
response to an invitation from the RSMinistry of Health and
Social Welfare (Partner 2013). The following discussion of
capacities will describe struggles to achieve outcomes for
MeNeRaLi’s beneficiaries.
One of the most interesting differences is that this group
is more willing to engage in contentious politics, even
though such actions are approached carefully and strate-
gically. For MeNeRaLi, the threat of protest was both a
potent one and one not engaged in lightly. The staff first
gauged support for this measure by local chapters and
sought to engage other CSO allies. They gathered state-
ments from their members indicating that the members
were ready to stage public protests. In advance of a
meeting with the Ministry to which the government-rec-
ognized alliances were invited, MeNeRaLi staff proposed a
joint strategy and negotiating position. However, this did
not yield a joint position, and in the assessment of
MeNeRaLi staff, it was this lack of unity that led to failure
in achieving their goals.
A second strategy that was used by these CSOs more
frequently was active participation in response to participa-
tion opportunities. Active participation was coded as a
strategy if the CSO responded to an invitation to participate
by the government, e.g., MeNeRaLi’s response to consul-
tations regarding the revised LSW.However, formany of the
researched CSOs, government consultations are only pro-
forma and do not lead to substantive outcomes; their lesson
after participation was that it was a waste of time and, ‘I
wouldn’t do it again’ (Interview, 13 December 2013). This
indicates the way that participating CSOs weigh the required
investment of time against the potential but uncertain out-
comes. Given these conclusions, why do they keep engaging
in these consultations? Donor material and symbolic
resources that come with legitimacy among donors are what
distinguish the previous ‘intermediary’ group from the
‘representatives’ described here. In the absence of opportu-
nities, such as convening institutions or building transac-
tional capacity, CSOs with low donor legitimacy respond to
these consultations as their only option. In contrast, the ‘in-
termediary’ CSOs respond less to participation opportunities
because they have more effective alternatives.
The final salient strategy is that these CSOs applied
expertise more frequently than any other category. This is a
surprise given the literature which concludes that donor
support leads to a technocratic and professional approach
which inhibits civic agency (e.g., Chahim and Prakash
2014; Harriss 2001; Pouligny 2005). Applying expertise
refers to specialized knowledge, for example, the data that
MeNeRaLi had gathered regarding their developmentally
disabled beneficiaries, and which was recognized and
sought-after by the government. This information increases
their capacity in their own eyes because, ‘if I need some-
thing from the state it’s in my interest to have high-quality
information not that of the state’ (Interview, 12 November
2012). The relevance of expertise to the ability to achieve
outcomes was supported by a Federation Member of Par-
liament and frequent CSO ally who stated:
In a group like handicapped, for example, in which
there are several problems and some come up
repeatedly and they’re not addressed adequately in
law and regulations, it’s important to recognize the
problem and then expertly address the needs and what
can be done. Expertise is important. (Interview, 26
September 2012)
The relevant expertise is focused on the specific con-
stituencies and relevant laws and regulations. This dis-
cussion of expertise as a strategy will be continued in the
next section because it is less common for the CSOs that
enjoy legitimacy among donors but not citizens.
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This section has indicated how the civic agency of CSOs
that enjoy high legitimacy with citizens but low legitimacy
with donors is characterized by the representation of
specific constituencies via primarily participatory capaci-
ties. This category is distinguished by their more frequent
use of contentious politics, investing time in active par-
ticipation, and developing expertise that is applied in
advocacy initiatives. However, this expertise is often also
narrow (i.e., limited to a particular constituency and related
set of policy issues). The relevance of expertise as a
capacity thus supports a narrow civic agency focused on
these constituencies. In addition, lacking donor financial
and symbolic resources, these CSOs are less able to initiate
and pursue broad advocacy goals.
Legitimacy with Donors but not Citizens
This section will address those CSOs that are legitimate
with donors but not citizens. In doing so, it will return to
the strategy of applying expertise, which is inhibited for
this category. The reason for these varied applications of
expertise will be discussed in regards to diverse under-
standings of expertise itself. Next, a case-study CSO will
illustrate how CSOs in this category withdraw from
advocacy when faced with the lack of implementation of
formal outcomes. The civic agency of this category is thus
primarily characterized by the pursuit of their goals
through means other than advocacy, and limited rather than
strengthened by their expertise.
The previous section on ‘representative’ CSOs that
enjoy legitimacy with citizens but not donors discussed
their more frequent strategy of applying expertise. The
opposite holds for the present category—in fact, the one
significant difference for this category is that they use
expertise less frequently. This is a surprising result given
the focus in the CS strengthening literature on their bias
toward ‘professional’ and technocratic CSOs (e.g., Chahim
and Prakash 2014; Pouligny 2005). The explanation is that
for donors, expertise refers to project management skills,
such as grant and report writing, and English language
knowledge. Moreover, such skills are typically practiced
by staff whose epistemological frameworks derive from
practical experience, or ‘new forms’ of informal or inter-
disciplinary education. In contrast, the expertise applied by
CSOs that have high legitimacy with citizens referred to
knowledge of state policies, institutions, and how bureau-
cratic government systems work, with epistemological
frameworks derived from formal education in traditional
professions such as law and social work. These educational
programs are traditional in the sense that they existed in the
pre-war, Socialist period. Some examples of the latter
expertise are the procedures of Parliamentary hearings and
points of contradiction between different laws in the case
of MeNeRaLi. Other CSOs indicated expertise in medical
issues of their beneficiaries, municipal tender procedures,
and the workings of municipal councils. The conclusion is
that these different categories of CSO apply very different
forms of expertise.
The civic agency of this category will be presented
through the case-study Youth Information Agency (YIA),
which was formally established in 2001 and began earlier
as a spin-off organization of the foreign-funded Open
Society Institute. Over this period, YIA has engaged in
diverse approaches including high-level political advocacy,
trained successive groups of high school youth in activism,
and runs an entrepreneurship center from its office. Its
program Active Youth began in 2004 with a focus on
workshops and lobbying, for example by organizing public
dialogs between youth and local authorities. These efforts
to mobilize participation between youth and elected offi-
cials reflect the donor expectations described earlier that
they would strengthen civic agency. However, more recent
versions implement the youths’ priorities via fundraising
from companies. The YIA has shifted its focus from
advocacy because the government is inefficient and frag-
mented and a staff person was told by one government
counterpart, ‘strategies are for drawers’ (Interview, 8 Jan-
uary 2014). Although YIA no longer gets involved in
advocacy via strategy documents, it does work with the
government on addressing ‘practical questions’, such as
working with youth employment centers. The YIA case
was typical of the CSOs with this combination of legiti-
macy whose civic agency is limited and includes a retreat
from advocacy.
An initiative engaged in by YIA illustrates the rela-
tionship between forms of legitimacy and capacities. One
indicator of YIA’s legitimacy for donors was that it was
invited to implement a program initiated and funded by the
European Union Special Representative called ‘Generation
for Europe.’ The concept was to select 200 successful
young professionals and provide them assistance to for-
mulate and advocate for reform-oriented advocacy goals.
This shows a common approach to creating participation
opportunities in order to facilitate bottom-up change.
However, YIA staff indicated that the program’s lack of
legitimacy for its participants ultimately made it ineffective
in achieving these goals. In their view, the participants
were not motivated to significantly contribute to something
they perceived as a ‘foreign story’. Ultimately, the depar-
ture of its main foreign patron led to the abrupt end of the
program. Preexisting low levels of legitimacy with citizens
and the perception of donor support itself contributed to the
weakened civic agency because such initiatives were
viewed by citizens as heavily about form, weakly repre-
senting their priorities, and not able to contribute to desired
outcomes.
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This section addressed those CSOs that enjoy legitimacy
with donors but not citizens. They are ‘donor darlings’ in
the sense that they receive a disproportionate share of
donor funds at the expense of other categories, despite their
lack of legitimacy with citizens (Ker-Lindsay 2013,
p. 263). The explanation for the surprising finding that the
use of expertise is inhibited for this category appears to lie
in the different forms of expertise favored by donors and
the state. While donors favor project skills, state actors
favor traditional professional qualifications and expertise
developed in policy arenas. The lack of legitimacy for
these CSOs with citizens has led to civic agency that has
withdrawn from advocacy and is limited rather than
strengthened by their expertise.
Revisiting Legitimacy and Civic Agency
This section aims to connect the empirical findings with the
literature and theory on the relationship between CS
strengthening programs and governance. It will discuss two
mechanisms in the literature that link CS strengthening
programs to the weak civic agency and apolitical approa-
ches. The first mechanism is that CS strengthening pro-
grams lead to low legitimacy with citizens, thereby
inhibiting civic agency. The second mechanism is that
civic agency is inhibited because donors favor technocratic
and professional rather than political approaches. Next, I
will discuss the relevance of CSOs’ use of both citizen
participation and transactional engagement with the state
for CS strengthening. This section concludes with a dis-
cussion of the contribution of legitimacy to these debates.
First, the findings support the link made in the critique
of CS strengthening programs that low legitimacy with
citizens is a contributing factor to the adoption of apolitical
approaches by supported CSOs (Bebbington et al. 2008;
Kostovicova 2010; Pouligny 2005). Indeed, the ‘donor
darling’ CSOs that enjoy legitimacy with donors but not
citizens tend to follow apolitical approaches. Unlike CSOs
that do enjoy legitimacy with citizens, they are unable to
mobilize citizen participation for government consultations
or protest. Participation can be a salient capacity available
to CSOs as theorized (Diamond 1994; White 2004) but
with an important caveat: ‘for those CSOs with local
legitimacy’.
Second, the findings question the critique of CS
strengthening programs, which argues that technocratic and
professional approaches inhibit civic agency (Harriss 2001;
O’Brennan 2013). In this light, it is surprising that the
‘representative’ CSOs with high levels of local support and
low levels of donor support use expertise the most as an
advocacy strategy. As indicated in the findings, this is due
to differences regarding the nature of expertise. The
expertise applied by this group of CSOs is related to their
ability to engage in formal state processes via an under-
standing of legal and administrative systems, which is
strengthened by traditional professional qualifications.
Expertise can be a resource by which CSOs gain influence
if it is sought by the state (Fagan 2010, p. 73; Montoute
2016). Yet the expertise sought was rarely provided by the
‘donor darling’ CSOs but rather was most often by the
‘representative’ CSOs, which were the least involved in
donor programs.
Legitimacy adds to the debate about CS strengthening
programs for a number of reasons. First, it explains the
capacities available to CSOs. The salience of legitimacy is
supported by the finding that the ‘intermediary’ CSOs—
those with both forms of legitimacy—employ primarily
transactional capacities, which leads to broader outcomes.
Second, legitimacy encompasses the influence of both
endogenous and exogenous factors on governance patterns.
By considering both legitimacy with donors and citizens,
the findings nuance the often rather absolute conclusions
that can be drawn from the literature above regarding how
donor support leads to apolitical approaches (Bebbington
et al. 2008; Fagan 2005; Harriss 2001).
The findings support claims that despite low participa-
tory capacity, CSOs are also able to achieve outcomes by
engaging transactional capacities (Cı´sarˇ 2010; Petrova and
Tarrow 2007). This is relevant for the literature on CS
strengthening programs because donor resources were
found to enable these very transactional capacities. This
effect is surprising because donors frequently imagine a
direct effect of strengthening and enabling participation
(Ottaway and Carothers 2000). The findings also show how
donor resources over time influence the expectations of
political actors regarding how advocacy happens. Namely,
political actors come to expect benefits such as training
away from the office, the status of foreign support, and
media promotion. These benefits are what donor-supported
CSOs bring to the table. Thus, the findings point to the
unintended consequences of CS strengthening programs,
which reinforce transactional capacities rather than par-
ticipatory ones. Ultimately, donors and their CS strength-
ening programs also become part of patterns of
governance. Instead, the participatory potential can be
found with the CSOs that lack donor support.
Finally, the important role of CSOs that enjoy legiti-
macy with donors and citizens is surprising in the context
of the critiques of CS strengthening programs which see
donor legitimacy and local legitimacy in exclusive terms
(e.g., Chahim and Prakash 2014; Pouligny 2005; Verkoren
and van Leeuwen 2014). This group deserves additional
scholarly attention because the findings support their
broader civic agency and greater outcomes. These CSOs
were able to go beyond the ‘invited spaces’ of existing
participation mechanisms and enter ‘claimed spaces’ by
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creating new participation mechanisms, as in the case of
the youth councils (Gaventa 2006).
Conclusion
This article adopted civic agency as a theoretical frame-
work in order to reexamine critiques of CS strengthening
programs. Civic agency was analyzed in regards to the
goals selected and whether CSOs use participatory capac-
ities oriented toward mobilizing citizens or transactional
capacities, based on ties to political actors. This contributes
to better understanding of how CSOs engage in advocacy,
going beyond the assumptions that guide both the CS
strengthening programs as well as its critique. Finally, to
examine the claims of the critiques, I examined the civic
agency of CSOs with permutations of legitimacy for citi-
zens and donors. This highlights the active role of citizens
as those who grant or withhold legitimacy from particular
CSOs, a role rather absent in the critiques. This contributes
to a better understanding of CS strengthening programs and
their unintended impacts on governance.
The research found that it is the combined effects of
legitimacy for donors and citizens that provides insight into
the political potential and limitations of CSO advocacy in
the presence of CS strengthening programs. The most
interesting category is those CSOs enjoying legitimacy
with both donors and citizens; their civic agency is applied
for broader policy changes, such as creating new partici-
pation opportunities. Although it is largely based on ties to
political actors (i.e., transactional capacity), these CSOs are
also engaged in strengthening participatory ties to other
CSOs, including those with different kinds of legitimacy.
This combination of capacities increases their ability to be
intermediaries between donor and local interests and to
persist in their goals, giving them the unrecognized long-
term potential to influence governance.
The civic agency of CSOs that have legitimacy with
citizens but not donors can be described as a representation
of constituencies. These CSOs more readily engage in
participation, including protest but also consultations.
However, their lack of donor support limits their goals and
civic agency. In contrast, the ‘donor darlings’ enjoying
legitimacy with donors but not citizens most closely
resemble the apolitical NGOs frequently described in the
literature. However, they surprisingly apply expertise less
frequently in their advocacy, which can be explained by the
fact that the expertise that they offer is considered less
relevant by the state.
The findings addressing the potential results of CSO
civic agency paint a picture that is more complex and less
absolute than that given by the critiques of CS strength-
ening programs. CSOs in the two categories that enjoy
legitimacy with citizens (‘intermediaries’ and ‘representa-
tives’) demonstrate persistent civic agency in their goals
and actions, and these do lead to observable outcomes. The
findings also have policy relevance because current mul-
tiyear policies in Bosnia respond to the critiques by their
emphasis on representation, credibility, and autonomy as
necessary contributing factors for strengthening CS advo-
cacy roles (EU DG Enlargement 2013; USAID 2013).
Making decisions based on these factors, however, requires
a better understanding of the views of citizens and of how
donor programs themselves shape the potential of civic
agency. The implication, both for policy and for further
scholarship, is to pay greater attention to those CSOs that
enjoy both legitimacy with donors and with citizens
because of their potential to play intermediary roles.
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